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THE MATERIALITY OF PREJUDICE TO THE
INSURER AS A RESULT OF THE INSURED'S
FAILURE TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE
The question of whether prejudice to the insurer must be
shown in order to relieve the insurer of its responsibility under
the insurance policy has been the subject of much controversy in
recent years.1 Typically, the insured is involved in some form of
automobile accident, but is either unaware of his liability 2 or feels
that no liability exists on his part,3 and thus fails to immediately
notify the insurance company. Usually, the insured fails to give
notice until such time as a suit for damages is filed. The insurer
then claims that as a result of the insured's failure to give timely
notice it is put in a prejudicial position. The insurer alleges,
therefore, that it would be unfair to compel it to represent the in-
sured in any litigation, or to discharge any judgments against the
insured as a result of the accident. The insurer frequently alleges
that in the period of time between the accident and the actual re-
ceipt of notice by the insurer, the insurer has lost the opportunity
to make a thorough investigation 4 and that any statements gath-
ered after the late notice would be tarnished by the passage of
time and inhibited by the pressure on any available witnesses from
1. See generally 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4732
(1962); 13 G. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 692 (2d ed.
1965); 2 R. LONa, THE LAW OF LIABiLITY INSURANCE § 13.04 (1969).
2. Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 237
A.2d 676 (1968) (Defendant rented its ice hockey arena to an ice hockey
team, and during the course of a game, a spectator was struck by a puck.
A physician, attending the game as a spectator, treated the injured woman
and sent her to the hospital. The defendant was not informed of the
accident until a few days before he notified the plaintiff insurance company.
There was approximately a three and a half month interval between the
accident and notice to the plaintiff.).
3. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Day, 359 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.
1964) (Appellant's insured and two other boys were travelling in three
cars at relatively high speeds along a highway and one of the other boy's
car struck the appellee's car. Appellant insured's father questioned his
son and, contrary to rumors in the insured's town, was satisfied that the
three boys were not racing. Subsequently, insured and the other boy
not directly involved in the accident were made co-defendants in the
complaint, at which time appellant was notified by insured. There was
approximately a nine and a half month interval between the accident and
notice to the appellant insurance company.).
4. See, e.g., White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F. Supp. 1 (W.D.
Va. 1965); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Prosser, 239




The courts, in response to the insurer's allegations and prayers
to be relieved of their liability to the insured under the insurance
policy, have approached the problem from many angles. Some
courts have cast aside black-letter contract law and transformed
what might otherwise be an adhesion contract into an instrument,
the interpretation of which, is guided more by its purpose than
by its seemingly conclusive terms.6 The majority, however, have
refused to abandon their disciplined approach to contract law.
While there appears to be a trend towards a more liberal approach
in favor of the insured, 7 the plurality of courts still place great
emphasis on the sanctity of the policy.
8
This Comment will analyze the various methods which courts
employ when considering the question of prejudice to the insurer
and whether this prejudice should be considered as a factor in re-
lieving the insurer of liability to the insured under the insurance
contract.
PREJUDICE IMMATERIAL
A strict contractual interpretation of the provision to give no-
tice "as soon as practicable" results in construction of the notice
clause as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability to the
insured under the policy. Thus, a finding by the trier of facts
that the insured has failed to comply with the stipulation will
relieve the insurer of responsibility under the policy. The question
of prejudice to the insured, therefore, becomes immaterial.,
5. See, e.g., Boston Ins. Co. v. Malone & Hogan Hosp. Foundation,
269 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Tex. 1966), alf'd, 378 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1967); Brown
v. Security Fire & Indemn. Co., 244 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Va. 1965); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 21 Ill. App. 2d 314, 158 N.E.2d 428 (1959); Jeanette
Glass Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 370 Pa. 409, 88 A.2d 407
(1952).
6. Miller v. Marcantel, - La. -, 221 So. 2d 557 (1969); Cooper v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968). But see
Brown v. Security Fire & Indem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Va. 1965).
7. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443 (1951); 8 J. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4732 (1962); 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF
LrABILIrY INSURANCE §§ 13.04, 13.05 (1969).
8. See cases cited note 9 infra.
9. Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Sohm v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 352 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1965);
Lee v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 330 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1964); Lumbermans
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 287 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Va.
1968); Bruce v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 F. Supp. 439
(D. S.C. 1967); American Southern Ins. Co. v. England, 260 F. Supp. 55
(S.D. W.Va. 1966); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Fan-
nin, 257 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1966); General Accident Fire & Life
The majority of courts favor adherence to this strict contrac-
tual interpretation except where the terms of the policy are am-
biguous or unemphatic. 10 The rationale put forth by these courts
is that, when the parties have entered into a contract in which the
terms are expressly stated, courts should be reluctant to interpret
their meaning in contradiction to the stipulated intention of the
parties. In Waters v. American Automobile Insurance Co.," the
policy contained a forfeiture clause which stipulated that: "No
action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with the terms of
the policy." 12 The court expressed an intention not to alter the
unambiguous terms as set down by the parties, citing an early
decision 13 which held that ". . . a forfeiture clause in a contract
cannot be ignored; if the parties have decided to incorporate it
into their contract, the court must give it effect as written."'1 4 The
majority rationalized the harshness of this effect on the insured
by noting the necessity of prompt investigations to prevent un-
availability of witnesses, loss of information and the possibility of
fraudulent or collusive claims. The court, in applying Missouri
law and holding the notice provision to be a condition precedent
to the liability of the insurer on the insurance policy, then con-
cluded that ". . . only when a provision is ambiguous and sus-
ceptible of more than one interpretation should courts construe it
to avoid a forfeiture. When a provision is clear it must be given ef-
fect." 1' 5 This forfeiture may appear harsh, especially in light of the
fact that the insured may be acting in good faith when he fails to
give timely notice. Insureds, however, will often unjustifiably
delay notice to the insurer in an attempt to discern whether they
are liable, rather than placing that burden upon the insurer. They
don't want to risk antagonizing the insurer when no actual lia-
Assurance Corp. v. Prosser, 239 F. Supp. 735 (D. Alas. 1965); Lilly v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 234 F. Supp. 53 (D. Del. 1964); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Loyd, 173 F. Supp. 7 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Commercial Contractors
Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 31, 202 A.2d 498 (1964); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d 606 (1950); Lloyd
v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemn. Corp., 27 A.D.2d 396, 279 N.Y.S.2d 593
(1967); Clemmons v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 267 N.C. 495, 148 S.E.2d
640 (1966); Bonney v. Jones, - Ore. -, 439 P.2d 881 (1968); Underwriters
at Lloyds, London v. Harkins, 427 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Gable, 125 Vt. 519, 220 A.2d 165 (1966);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50 Wash. 2d 443,
313 P.2d 347 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Prosser, 239
F. Supp. 735 (D. Alas. 1965); Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Harkins,
427 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
11. 363 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
12. Id. at 686.
13. Dezell v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 176 Mo. 253, 75 S.W. 1102 (1903).
14. Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684, 687 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
15. Id. at 688.
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bility exists on their part.
While courts of the majority view apparently base their deci-
sions on strict adherence to contract law, their opinions sometimes
reflect a recognition of and concern about possible injustices which
result to the insurer by an unreasonable delay in receiving notice.
These majority courts note that injustices to the insurer caused
by unreasonable delay in receiving notice may cause consequential
harm to the public through higher premiums' 6 and ineffective in-
surance administration.17 The recognition of such public policy
considerations, however, appears paradoxical. If a court feels that
the insurer will be prejudiced by a delay, it would be more con-
sistent with their recognition of the policy considerations noted
above to allow the insured to rebut this judicial presumption or to
compel the insurer to prove that prejudice did in fact result.
The court in Boston Insurance Co. v. Malone,' expressed dis-
satisfaction with a verdict finding the insurer liable on a policy de-
spite a notice delay of twenty months. The majority illustrated
its recognition of relevant policy considerations by stating: "A
public liability insurance company could hardly exist on reason-
able premiums if its opportunity to investigate and settle possible
claims in the early stage was dependent on the biased judgment of
their insureds on questions of the matter." 19 Although the insured
16. Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966):
* * .rulings reflect the fact that efficient and economical liability
insurance administration requires early knowledge of the claim
in order that proper investigation may be made. Contractual pro-
visions to secure this interest are, thus, to be given effect in the
interest of the public as well as that of the insurer.
Id. at 687.
17. Yorkshire Indem. Co. v. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co., 252 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1958): "Insurance companies under the pressure both of tra-
ditional schemes of statutory penalties and the general adverse psycholog-
ical climate in litigation are expected to perform fully and quickly." Id.
at 656-57.
18. 269 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 378 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.
1967) (A patient in defendant's hospital was burned through the overuse of
a heating pad which he requested from the nurse against doctor's orders.
The patient was a diabetic and thus was not allowed to have the heating
pad, a fact which the patient knew, but the nurse didn't. The manager
of defendant hospital made an investigation and, although he failed to talk
to the injured patient or his wife, was satisifed that the harm was clearly
the result of the patient's own negligence. Approximately four months
after the accident defendant heard a rumor that the patient might sue, but
after consultation with the patient's father-in-law, a trustee of defendant
hospital, defendant decided the rumor was groundless. Approximately
twenty-one and a half months after patient's accident, the defendant
hospital was sued and three days later notified the plaintiff insurance
company.).
19. Id. at 21.
in this case was perhaps biased in ascertaining the extent of its
liability, the insured did act in good faith in failing to give timely
notice. It, therefore, seems unfair to relieve the insurer of its duty
to defend in the absence of proof by the insurer showing that it
has suffered prejudice. The insurer is, of course, defending itself
as well as the insured since any judgment against the insured must
be satisfied by the insurer within the policy limits. However, it
seems unjust to allow the insurer to escape liability without proof
of actual damages on the part of the insurer, where the insured,
acting in good faith, fails to give timely notice.20  The function of
the notice provision is to prevent prejudice to the insurer, and un-
less prejudice has been proven, the condition precedent has, in es-
sence, been complied with.
Courts which favor a strict interpretation of the insurance con-
tract are unwavering in applying a strict construction to cases
where a forfeiture clause is embodied in the policy.2 1 Generally,
courts are reluctant to interpret the clauses of the contract except
where ambiguity is present. 22 The forfeiture clause, unlike many
other contractual provisions, is seldom considered to be either un-
clear or ambiguous. 23 While there are courts which consider the
notice provision as a condition precedent regardless of the inclusion
of the forfeiture clause, 24 there is a trend to require a showing of
prejudice where the policy does not contain such a clause.25 Con-
tract law is applied, but the terms of the contract are considered
20. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grillon, 101 N.J. Super. 327, 244 A.2d 322
(Ch. 1968) (court analogized prejudice to laches, since to establish that
defense there must be a showing of actual prejudice).
21. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d
606 (1950). An example of the type of specific forfeiture clause referred
to in the text is: "No action shall be against the company unless, as a
condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with the
terms of the policy." Id. at 160, 216 P.2d 609. See generally Annot., 18
AL.R.2d 443 (1951).
22. See cases cited note 10 supra. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
443 (1951).
23. See cases cited note 9 supra. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
443 (1951).
24. See, e.g., Sohm v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 352 F.2d
65 (6th Cir. 1965); Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co.,
287 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Va. 1968); American Southern Ins. Co. v. England,
260 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. W. Va. 1966). See generally State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d 606 (1950); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
443 (1951).
25. In Underwriters of Lloyds, London v. Harkins, 427 S.W.2d 659
(Tex. Civ. App. 1968), the court decided that prejudice was immaterial and
that no showing of harm was necessary, since the policy had a specific
forfeiture clause for failing to comply with a condition precedent. The
court went on to say that there was no room for interpretation as the pro-
vision was emphatic, but that they might possibly have reached a differ-
ent conclusion if the policy hadn't contained the specific forfeiture clause.
See'also Leach v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Exch., 70 Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 920
-(1950); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Gable, 125 Vt. 519, 220
A.2d 165 (1966); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co.,
50 Wash. 2d 443, 313 P.2d 347 (1957).
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vague and ambiguous, and the intent and purpose of the parties,
as opposed to their expressed agreement, thus become important.2"
This theory was adopted by the court in Miller v. Marcantel,2 7 a
decision which reflected the idea that the insurer-insured relation-
ship becomes distorted when the notice provision is inserted in an
insurance contract and the insurer pleads that it is to be given
effect without a showing of any prejudice. The court then criti-
cized the practice of strict contractual interpretation:
The function of the notice requirement is simply to prevent
the insurer from being prejudiced, not to provide a tech-
nical escape-hatch by which to deny coverage in the ab-
sence of prejudice nor to evade the fundamental protective
purpose of the insurance contract to assure the insured
and the general public that liability claims will be paid
up to the policy limits for which premiums were collected .
2
8
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cassinelli29
the question of the effect to be given specific forfeiture clauses
was discussed in great detail. Although the discussion was dictum,
it reflects the indecision common to most courts in treating this
issue. The court found prejudice to be immaterial, but relied upon
the majority rule Which dictates such a finding if the insurance
policy in question contains a forfeiture clause. The court went on
to say that the insured's counsel had presented a fair and equitable
argument against the application of the strict contract interpreta-
tion rule, but that the cases cited in their behalf did not expressly
contain forfeiture clauses. The court, therefore, concluded that
it would be presumptuous on our part to establish a rule of
law in this state which departs from the overwhelming majority
of decisions throughout the United States. 830  This reasoning does
not reflect an enlightened or equitable disposition in dealing with
injustices, especially since the court recognized the admittedly in-
equitable rule and failed to exercise an option to remedy an unfair
practice.
It is submitted that to make a condition precedent of the notice
provision is to ignore reality. Although the purpose of the policy
is to protect the insured, insurance carriers are quick to reprimand
those who submit claims. Large claims will probably result in the
sky-rocketing of the insured's premiums, if not the cancellation of
26. See, e.g., Miller v. Marcantel, - La. -, 221 So. 2d 557 (1969);
Cooper v. Government. Employees Ins. Co., 51. N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968).
27. - La. -, 221 So. 2d 557 (1969).
28. Id. at -, 221 So. 2d at 559.
29. 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d 606 (1950)..
30. Id. at 164, 216 P.2d at. 615...See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443
(1951).
his entire policy. 31 Courts point out that a forfeiture of the in-
sured's rights under the policy is to be limited to the particulars
of a given incident. That statement, however, fails to recognize
the other possible penalties the insured will suffer at the hands
of the insurer. It is perhaps the realization of the possible detri-
mental effects of giving notice that causes many insureds to be
reluctant to submit a notice of accident before they are satisfied
that they are liable or that a claim will result. It is submitted
that if under strict legal concepts this is bad faith on the part of the
insured in light of the policy stipulations, he should be excused,
for he is caught between the necessity of having adequate insur-
ance coverage and the efforts of insurance companies to punish
insureds who demand performance under the insurance contract.
PREJUDICE MATERIAL
The absence of a specific forfeiture clause has generally been
regarded as an invitation to the courts to consider the terms of
the policy vague and ambiguous and thus enable them to interpret
the policy in light of the parties' intentions at the time the insur-
ance contract was completed. 32 This, however, does not relieve the
penalties of forfeiture worked upon the insureds by the strict effect
frequently given to the specific forfeiture clause, and therefore
many jurisdictions, through their decisions and by statutes, have
attempted to mitigate these harsh results through various substan-
tive devices.
In some instances, the courts acknowledge the notice provision
as a condition precedent; however, upon a showing of the unrea-
sonableness of delay, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is cre-
ated in favor of the insurer.33 Instead of the strict interpretation
31. The Cost of Casualties, TIME, (Jan. 26, 1968), at 20-21; The Busi-
ness with 103 Million Unsatisfied Customers, TIME, (June 2, 1967), at 63;
The Auto-Insurance-Tangle-Federal Controls on the Way?, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, (Feb. 26, 1968), at 102-04.
32. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
33. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4732 (1962):
Many courts have adopted the rule that it is unnecessary for
the company to show that it was prejudiced by the neglect of the
insured in order to assert this policy defense, it being frequently
stated that prejudice is presumed under these circumstances. This
does not mean that upon a showing of delay, alone, the insurer
walks out of court free of potential claims. It means rather, that
prejudice being a difficult matter affirmatively to prove, it is not
required to make such proof. Prejudice may be presumed, with the
burden upon the one seeking to impose liability to show that no
liability did, in fact, occur-for example that a complete investi-
gation was made by another insurer or by competent persons who
turned over the results to the "late notice" insurer.
Id. at 17. See also Canadian Universal Ins. Co. v. Northwest Hosp. Inc.,
389 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1968); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lochmandy
Buick Sales, 302 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962); Hubner & Williams Constr.
Co. v. London Guar. & Accident Co., 280 F. Supp. 288 (D. Colo. 1967);
Neisz v. Albright, 217 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1969); Sanderfoot v. Sherry Motors,
Inc., 33 Wis. 2d 301, 147 N.W.2d 255 (1967) (court applied statute Wis.
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view which conclusively relieves the insurer of its liability upon
proof of unreasonable delay, rebuttal of the presumption of preju-
dice by the insured is possible and will dictate a finding that the
insurer remains liable under the insurance policy. As a result of
this rebuttable presumption device, insurers cannot relieve them-
selves of responsibility merely by labeling the stipulation a condi-
tion precedent and consequently, extreme forfeitures may be
avoided. 4  The advantage to the insured in the rebuttable pre-
sumption approach, in addition to avoiding inequitable forfeitures,
is that the question of prejudice goes to the jury for a determination
regarding its presence or absence; whereas, the question of the
insurer's liability under the strict contractual interpretation ap-
proach is commonly treated as a matter of law to be ruled on by
the judge. Allowing the jury to consider the question of prejudice
benefits the insured in that juries appear to be more favorable to
private individuals in disputes with insurance companies. 35
Several courts have voiced displeasure with the presumption
of prejudice approach, holding that prejudice to the insurer
amounts to mere speculation and conjecture. 6 While it is difficult
for either party to prove or disprove prejudice, since the insurer
chooses to disclaim liability, it should have the burden of justifying
the disclaimer.87 As was stated in Campbell v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,3
8 in light of the social function of the insurance policy "...
to provide compensation for those negligently injured in automo-
bile accidents through no fault of their own. . . a judicially created
presumption of prejudice, whether conclusive or rebuttable, is
unwarranted.
39
Another theory regarding the materiality of prejudice is pre-
STAT. ANN. § 204.34(3) (1933) which created a presumption of prejudice
in favor of the insurer upon a showing of untimely notice).
34. See, e.g., Hubner & Williams Constr. Co. v. London Guar. & Acci-
dent Co., 280 F. Supp. 288 (D. Colo. 1967); American Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Collura, 163 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1964).
35. Book Note, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1436 (1955).
36. See, e.g., Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 311
(1968); Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 308, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 827 (1963).
37. Young v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1941):
This speculative or hypothetical prejudice is not the kind of prej-
udice at which the law looks in construing a clause of this kind.
An obligation of the nature of that assumed by the insurer under
this policy cannot be wiped out and destroyed on such speculative
grounds.
Id. at 880. See generally 2 R. LoNc, THE LAWS OF LIABrLITy INsuAicN-
§ 13.06 (1969).
38. 60 Cal. 2d 308, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
39. Id. at 310, 384 P.2d at 157, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 829 (1963).
sented by courts which avoid the inflexibility of the strict condi-
tion precedent concept by construing the question of prejudice to
the insurer as one of the factors in determining the reasonableness
of delay. 40 If no prejudice to the insurer is shown, the insured's
failure to give notice "as soon as practicable" will not necessarily
be unreasonable and the insured may be said to have complied with
the terms of the policy. By this method, although the burden of
proof is substantially on the insured to show compliance with the
condition precedent of notice, the insurer is forced to introduce
proof of prejudice if it wishes to escape liability under the policy.
Thus, the insurer will not be allowed to shun its duties through a
presumption of prejudice when, in fact, no prejudice did result.
Construing the question of prejudice as one of the factors in
determining reasonableness of delay, while more advantageous to
the insured than the presumption standard in that it shifts the
burden of proving prejudice to the insurer, has a possible short-
coming as advanced by the court in Cooper v. Government Em-
ployees Insurance Co.4  The Cooper court criticized the practice
of making the question of prejudice one of the factors in deter-
mining reasonableness of delay in that it could conceivably make
unreasonable a notice which was in fact timely if prejudice some-
how resulted to the insurer.4 2 Although the reasoning used in
Cooper has merit, a prior decision4 3 had developed a procedure
which not only considered prejudice a factor in determining the
unreasonableness of delay, but also avoided the pitfall suggested in
Cooper. In Young v. Travelers Insurance Co., 44 after discarding a
suggested presumption in favor of the insurer as being conjectural,
the court stated its holding:
Thus in applying the clause, we think that if it is made to
appear that the notice was given reasonably quickly after
the occurrence of the accident, it will not be open to the
company to prove that a more immediate notice would
have been more effective in preparing their defense, for
the time provisions of the clause would have been in
effect complied with. On the other hand, if it appears that
the giving of the notice has been delayed longer than was
reasonably required physically to give the notice, then the
material question would be whether the delay has caused
prejudice.
45
Young was probably the forerunner of what today is the most
40. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wabash Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 637 (D. Minn. 1967); Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Radio Foods Corp., 108 N.H. 494, 240 A.2d 47 (1968). See also Turner
Cartage & Storage Co. v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 497, 159 N.W.2d
863 (1968).
41. 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968).
42. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
43. Young v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1941).
44. 119 F.2d 877 (5th Cir. 1941).
45. Id. at 880.
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liberal approach to the question of the materiality of prejudice to
the insurer. Several courts, disgruntled by the great hardships
suffered by insureds through loss of insurance coverage46 and the
difficulty in disproving any prejudice to the insurer,47 established
the doctrine that prejudice is both a material inquiry in determin-
ing the extent of the insurer's liability to the insured under the
policy, and that the burden of proving such prejudice should be
on the insurer, not the insured.48  California has carried this ap-
proach one step further by discarding presumptions in favor of the
insurer, and ignoring the existence of the specific forfeiture clause
in the insurance contract.49  In Maryland, subsequent to Watson
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 50 which held the insurer
relieved from showing prejudice, the legislature enacted a remedial
statute. The insurer now has, by reason of the statute,51 the bur-
den of showing prejudice in cases involving failure to give timely
notice. In a decision5 2 subsequent to the enactment of the statute,
a Maryland court interpreted the legislation as requiring proof of
prejudice by the insurer in spite of the existence of a specific for-
feiture clause.
46. Miller v. Marcantel, - La. -, 221 So. 2d 557 (1969).
47. Powell v. Home Indem. Co., 343 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1965):
All notices of accidents which are not given immediately are not
necessarily prejudicial to the insurer. Actual prejudice must be
shown by the insurance company. Prejudice will not be presumed.
Id. at 860. See also Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 308, 384 P.2d
155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
48. See, e.g., Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 364
F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1966); Miller v. Lindgate Developers, Inc., 274 F. Supp.
980 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container &
Timber Processing Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D. Ore. 1966) (applying
Ohio law); Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 103 Ariz. 160, 438
P.2d 311 (1968); Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 308, 384 P.2d
155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963); Miller v. Marcantel, - La. -, 221 So. 2d 557
(1969); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 219 A.2d
820 (1966); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d
870 (1968); Fox v. National Say. Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967).
49. Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 308, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 827 (1963).
50. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963).
51. MD. STAT. ANN. art. 48A, § 482 (1968):
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy
of motor vehicle liability insurance issued by it, on the ground
that the insured or anyone claiming the benefits of the policy
through the insured has breached the policy by failing to cooperate
with the insurer or by not giving requisite notice to the insurer,
such disclaimer shall be effective only if the insurer establishes
by a preponderance of affirmative evidence that such lack of co-
operation or notice has resulted in actual prejudice to the insurer.
52. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 219 A.2d
820 (1966)
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Cooper v. Government Em-
ployees Insurance Co.53 has, in an in-depth analysis of the situation,
presented a rationale regarding prejudice in both a strict and lib-
eral context of contract construction. The Cooper court cited
Whittle v. Associated Indemnity Corp.54 in which it had been held
that where the insured failed to give timely notice under a specific
forfeiture clause provision similar to the one in Cooper, prejudice
to the insurer was immaterial. The Whittle court had reasoned
".. . the law does not make a better contract for the parties than
they make for themselves,"55 and that ". . . 'our function' is to
'enforce a contract as written.' "56 The Whittle reasoning, it is
submitted, constitutes a naive approach to the insurer-insured re-
lationship in light of the basically adhesion nature of an insurance
policy; yet many courts, even today, expound that theory. The
court in Cooper felt that the Whittle approach would result in great
injustice to the insured and considered instead the procedure as
advanced in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Campbell,57 a later case
which considered the question whether prejudice should be a factor
in determining the reasonableness of delay in giving notice. The
Cooper court felt the Campbell approach to be also ineffective and
stated: "The difficulty with this approach is that the prejudicial
factor could unwittingly be turned against the insured if prejudice
were permitted to lead to a loss of coverage, notwithstanding that
notice was in fact given as soon as practicable."58
Having rejected the decisions and rationales of both Whittle
and Campbell, the Cooper court offered, as an independent theory,
a complete analysis of the situation. The adhesion quality of the
contract was first cited:
Since then we have recognized that the terms of an in-
surance policy are not talked out or bargained for as in the
case of contracts generally, that the insured is chargeable
with these terms because of a business utility rather than
because he read and understood them, and hence an
insurance contract should be read to accord with the rea-
sonable expectations of the purchaser so far as its language
will permit.59
In addition, the harshness of forfeiture and the social function of
insurance were considered as further support for requiring the
insurer to prove prejudice, even in those cases where specific for-
feiture clauses were involved. The decision emphasized the fact
that, in addition to the insured, innocent members of the public
53. 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968), discussed previously at notes 41-43
and accompanying text supra.
54. 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866 (E. & A. 1943).
55. Id. at 581, 33 A.2d at 869.
56. Id.
57. 95 N.J. Super. 142, 230 A.2d 179 (Ch. 1967).
58. Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 92, 237
A.2d 870, 873 (1968).
59. Id. at 93, 237 A.2d at 873-74.
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might go uncompensated for their injuries.
And although the policy may speak of the notice provision
in terms of a "condition precedent," as Whittle observed,
nonetheless, what is involved is a forfeiture, for the car-
rier seeks on account of a breach of the provision to deny
the insured the very thing paid for. This is not to belittle
the need for notice of an accident, but rather to put the
subject in perspective. Thus viewed, it becomes unrea-
sonable to read the provision unrealistically or to find that
the carrier may forfeit the coverage, even though there is
no likelihood that it was prejudiced by the breach. To
do so would be unfair to the insureds. It would also dis-
serve the public interest for insurance is an instrument of
a social policy that the victims of negligence be compen-
sated. To that end, companies are franchised to sell cov-
erage. We should therefore be mindful also of the vic-
tims of accidental events in deciding whether a forfeiture
should be upheld 0
The Cooper court then concluded that "... the carrier may
not forfeit the bargained for protection unless there are both a
breach of the notice provision and a likelihood of appreciable prej-
udice. The burden of persuasion is the carriers."' 1  Cooper, like
Young, thus held prejudice to be essential for the insurer to be
relieved of its liability. Both decisions, however, insist that the
insured's failure to comply with the "condition precedent" of timely
notice must be first shown.
Although other courts have followed Cooper and have com-
pelled the insurer to prove prejudice in spite of the presence of a
specific forfeiture clause,62 many authorities still do not require
any showing of prejudice where a specific forfeiture clause is in-
volved.6s The greatest breakdown of the strict interpretation ap-
60. Id. at 93, 237 A.2d at 874.
61. Id. at 94, 237 A.2d at 874.
62. See, e.g., Miller v. Lindgate Developers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 980
(E.D. Mo. 1967); Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 103 Ariz. 160,
438 P.2d 311 (1968); Miller v. Marcantel, La. , 221 So. 2d 557 (1969);
Fox v. National Say. Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967).
63. See, e.g., Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Sohm v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 352 F.2d 65 (6th
Cir. 1965); Lee v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 330 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1964);
Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 287 F. Supp. 932
(W.D. Va. 1968); Bruce v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 F. Supp.
439 (D. S.C. 1967); National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v.
Fannin, 257 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1966); Lilly v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
234 F. Supp. 53 (D. Del. 1964); Hartford Accident & Indemn. Co. v. Loyd,
173 F. Supp. 7 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Commercial Contractors Corp. v. Ameri-
can Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 31, 202 A.2d 498 (1964); Lloyd v. Motor Vehicle
Accident Indem. Corp., 27 A.D. 396, 279 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1967); Clemmons v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 267 N.C. 495, 148 S.E.2d 640 (1966); Bonney v.
proach has been limited to those policies which do not contain spe-
cific forfeiture clauses.6 4 Thus, the insured may not anticipate too
much relief in the future, for all the insurer need do to have the
benefit of absolution from its contractual obligations without a
showing of prejudice is to include a specific forfeiture clause in the
policy.
Justice Musmanno, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
a dissent to an early decision6 5 holding prejudice to the insurer to
be immaterial because the notice provision was considered a con-
dition precedent to the insurer's liability, eloquently stated the
plight of the insured:
To allow an indemnity insurance company to escape re-
sponsibility for the very thing it bound itself to anticipate
is to lay down a precedent of perilous potentialities. Car-
rying it into its ultimate ramifications it could endanger
faith in what is undoubtedly one of the strongest pillars
in the temple of the American way of life, namely, the
insurance policy. 66
Pennsylvania has subsequently altered its decision and now holds
the insurer to have the burden of proving prejudice in such cases.
6 7
CONCLUSION
The majority of courts still adhere to an interpretation of the
notice provision as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability,
especially in policies containing specific forfeiture clauses. Those
courts which have discarded the strict contract interpretation ap-
proach in favor of theories expounding a presumption of prejudice
or a consideration of prejudice as a factor in determining the un-
reasonableness of delay achieve more equitable results than those
following the strict contract interpretation approach. Even those
decisions, however, fail to reflect a true insight into the insurer-
insured relationship. Not until such time as all of the courts de-
mand a showing of actual prejudice to the insurer will the inten-
Jones, Ore. , 439 P.2d 881 (1968); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d 606 (1950). See generally Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 443 (1951).
64. See, e.g., Hubner & Williams Constr. Co. v. London Guar. &
Accident Co., 280 F. Supp. 288 (D. Colo. 1967); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Martin Bros. Container & Timber Processing Corp., 256 F. Supp. 145 (D.
Ore. 1966); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Prosser, 239
F. Supp. 735 (D. Alas. 1965); Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Radio Foods
Corp., 108 N.H. 494, 240 A.2d 47 (1968); Underwriters at Lloyds, London
v. Harkins, 427 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Gable, 125 Vt. 519, 220 A.2d 165 (1966); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50 Wash. 2d 443, 313 P.2d 347 (1957).
See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 443 (1951).
65. Jeanette Glass Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of North America, 370 Pa.
409, 88 A.2d 407 (1952).
66. Id. at 420, 88 A.2d at 412.
67. Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 364 F.2d 246
(3d Cir. 1966); Wiseman v. United States, 327 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1964).
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tions and expectations held by both of the parties when entering
into the insurance contract be given their true effect.
It is submitted that the current views propounded by New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, California and Maryland, with regard to the
materiality of prejudice to the insurer, are more equitable, con-
form to the expectations of the insured, promote the social func-
tions of insurance coverage and offer a result consistent with the
sometimes punitive restrictions on the submission of claims by the
insured to the insurer. The insurer should not be permitted,
through the introduction in the policy of forfeiture provisions, to
avoid responsibility either to the insured or to the public as a
whole.
F. WARREN JACOBY
